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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a two-country world di¤erential game model with a
polluting rm in each country where there is transportation cost to investigate the
equilibrium of the game between rms when they decide to trade or not and to
see under which conditions social welfare coincides with the market equilibrium.
We nd out that in the static game bilateral trade is always the equilibrium for
any acceptable transportation cost while in the dynamic game social planner can
prevent the ine¢ cient outcome by imposing and determining the proper amount of
Pigouvian taxation.
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1 Introduction
Controlling the emission of environment-damaging pollution caused by increased economic
activity has received a considerable attention in the eld of environmental economics.
Given that the pollution function is increasing in the output of the industry, we have the
usual trade-o¤ between the price e¤ect and the negative externality. If we restrict the
output the environment is cleaner but the price is higher.
International trade is playing an important role in expanding global economic activities
and there is an increasing amount of literature regarding trade and the environment in
trade theory1. However, there are not too many contributions regarding the e¤ects of
trade liberalization in a dynamic context. What creates negative externality is the stock
of pollution not just the current emission of pollution. Thus, we need a dynamic model
to study the environmental e¤ect of trade liberalization due to the fact that pollution is
accumulated over time. Fujiwara (2009) investigates the e¤ects of free trade on global
stock of pollution using a two country di¤erential game model. We develop a two-country
world di¤erential game model, where there is a polluting rm in each country, to derive the
open-loop and feedback equilibria of the game between rms in case of autarchy, unilateral
and bilateral trade when there is transportation cost and also a Pigouvian tax is introduced
to reduce damaging emissions.
Most of the existing contributions in the eld of environmental economics examine the
existence of Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing rms to reduce damaging emissions
directly2 or indirectly3. Accordingly, the common approach to deal with this problem in
all of these studies is to derive the rst best, where a social planner chooses a welfare
maximizing production plan, and introduce corrective taxes to induce prot-seeking rms
to produce at socially optimum level. In our study, the game between social planners
is not technically solvable. As a result, it is not possible to outline the social optimum.
However, we gure out the market equilibrium and determine which one of the three cases
of bilateral trade, unilateral trade or autarchy is the equilibrium of the game between
two rms according to the transportation cost and Pigouvian tax quantity. Then, we
1See Copeland and Taylor (2003), Antweiler et al. (2001), inter alia.
2See Bergstrom et al. (1981), Karp and Livernois (1992, 1994), Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002)
and Tsur and Zemel (2008).
3To this regard, see Downing and White (1986), Milliman and Prince (1989), Damania (1996), Chiou
and Hu (2001) and Tsur and Zemel (2002), Dragone et al. (2009).
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determine the extent of tax amount for various quantities of negative externality to which
social welfare coincides with market equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs a basic model.
Section 3 briey outlines the static version of the game. In section 4, the di¤erential game
is illustrated and the open-loop and feedback equilibria under autarchy, unilateral and
bilateral trade are characterized. Prots and social welfares are assessed in section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Setup
There are two similar countries, indexed by i = 1; 2. In each country there is a rm which
produces a single output. Firms supply a homogenous good and their productions, qi,
have two parts:
qi = qii + qij; i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qii and qij denote the amounts of output produced by rm i and consumes in
domestic market and is exported to the other country, respectively. It is obvious that the
second part becomes zero if there isnt any export.
Exporting rm must pay an iceberg transportation cost which depends on the amount
of export. In our setting, m 2 (0; 1] captures the e¤ect of transportation cost. If there is
no transportation cost, m is equal to one. Therefore, the inverse demand function in each
country is
pi = a  (qii +mqji); i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
where qji is the amount of goods which is exported by the rm j into country i.
Technology is the same for both rms and production takes place at constant returns
to scale (CRS), with a constant marginal cost c. It is summarized by the cost function
Ci = cqi(t). Hence, rm is instantaneous prots are
i (t) = pi (t) qii (t) + pj (t) (mqij (t))  cqi (t) :
The production of the nal output creates a negative externality in the form of polluting
emissionsow E(t) = Q(t), which increases the stock of pollution, Z. Pollution is accu-
mulated over time and is transboundary. The accumulation process of the world pollutant
2
follows:
_Z (t) =
2P
i=1
qi (t)  kZ (t) ; k > 0; (1)
where k is the natural purication rate of the pollutant.
The stock of pollution lowers the consumer surplus by the following rule:
CSi (t) =
(qii (t) +mqji (t))
2
2
  hZ (t)
2
2
; h > 0;
where h measures the e¤ect of negative externality on consumers. However, the instanta-
neous social welfare in each country is the aggregate amount of rms prots and consumer
surplus:
SWi (t) = i (t) + CSi (t) . (2)
By knowing this setting, we are deriving rmsprot equilibria in autarchy, unilateral and
bilateral trade. We will compare these prots as well as social welfares to obtain the trade
strategy from the viewpoints of the both, the social planner and the rms.
3 The Static Problem
As a preliminary step, in this section, we consider the static Cournot game in order to
examine the case where rms maximize their prot functions without taking into account
the negative externality because of the lack of corrective tax. We consider the game in
gure 1 in which rms make their trade strategy decision, where Ai , 
T
i (
NT
i ) and 
BT
i
denote the optimal prot of rm i in the case of autarchy, trade (not trade) in unilateral
and bilateral trade, respectively.
Figure 1: The game between two rms when they decide to trade (T) or not (NT).
In autarchy case, there is no trade between the two countries and each rm is monopolist
in its own country with the optimal quantity level of (a  c) =2. In the unilateral and
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bilateral trade where rms play under Cournot competition, the equilibrium amount of
outputs is summarized in lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium amounts of rms output in unilateral trade under (static)
Cournot competition are
qTii =
a  c
2
; qTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
;
qNTjj =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
:
Proof. The maximization problem of trading and not trading rms are
Ti = max
qii;qij
(a  qii)qii + (a  qjj  mqij)(mqij)  c(qii + qij); (3)
NTj = max
qjj
(a  qjj  mqij)qjj   cqjj; (4)
with the following necessary conditions (FOCs):
@Ti
@qii
= a  2qii   c = 0; (5)
@Ti
@qij
= am mqjj   2m2qij   c = 0; (6)
@NTi
@qjj
= a  2qjj  mqij   c = 0: (7)
Consequently, the resulting levels of individual output are
qTii =
a  c
2
; qTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
; qNTjj =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium amounts of rms output in bilateral trade under (static)
Cournot competition are
qBTii =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
; qBTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
:
Proof. The maximization problem of rms in case of bilateral trade, which is the same
for both because of symmetry, would be
BTi = max
qii;qij
(a  qii  mqji)qii + (a  qjj  mqij)(mqij)  c(qii + qij): (8)
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The rst order conditions of this problem w.r.t. controls are
@BTi
@qii
= a  2qii  mqji   c = 0; (9)
@BTi
@qij
= am mqjj   2m2qij   c = 0; (10)
which leads to this solution:
qBTii =
(a  2c)m+ c
3m
; qBTij =
(a+ c)m  2c
3m2
:
Comparing the corresponding prots on autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade, it is
clear that Ti > 
A
i , 
BT
i > 
NT
i and 
A
i > 
BT
i . Therefore:
Proposition 1 Under the static framework trade is dominant strategy for both rms and
(BT1 ; 
BT
2 ) is the Nash equilibrium of the game where rms decide to trade or not. This
is a prisoners dilemma game.
Proof. This follows from equilibrium in autarchy and lemmas 1 and 2.
Now, we are interested in welfare comparison across the four cases which is summarized
in:
Corollary 1 Under the static framework bilateral trade is Pareto e¢ cient if
h <
k2m2(5am+ c(17m  22))
4(m  2)(c(4 +m( 4 + 7m))  am(2 + 5m)) ; (11)
which coincides the equilibrium of the rmsgame. Otherwise, social welfare has the most
amount in the case of autarchy.
Proof. By plugging qii, qij, qjj and qji into the stationary condition _Z = 0, the steady
state stock of pollution is obtained which in turn can be plugged into (2) in order to get
social welfare amounts in autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade. Comparing the acquired
welfares, we obtain the inequality.
Corollary 2 The less transportation cost is, the more bilateral trade is socially preferable.
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Proof. The right hand side of the inequality (11) is increasing in m which means in order
for bilateral trade becomes socially e¢ cient, h can have a larger value when transportation
cost decreases. This concludes the proof.
However, trade liberalization would increase rmsoutput which has two contradictory
e¤ects on consumer surplus. Output increase, on the one hand, would directly raise con-
sumer surplus, on the other hand, increases the stock of pollution which in turn reduces
consumer surplus. Now, if inequality (11) holds or in the other words h is small enough,
pollution increment does not reduce the consumer surplus that much and consumers will
benet from output enlargement. But, we know that most of the time h is not su¢ ciently
small.
4 The Dynamic Game
As it is said before, the production of nal output creates a cross-boundary negative exter-
nality which is accumulated over time and follows the dynamic (1). Now, by introducing a
corrective (Pigouvian) tax, in quadratic form, the rms are forced to internalize the nega-
tive externality of pollution in a dynamic framework. Therefore, the rm is optimization
problem is formulated as:
max
qi
i 
Z 1
0
e rt
h
pi qii + pj (mqij)  c (qii + qij)  s
2
Z2
i
dt; (12)
subject to (1) and Z(0) = Z0. Parameter r > 0 is a constant rate of discount common
to all rms and parameter s is a policy instrument that policy maker by manipulating it
modies taxation. This taxation is not the same if rms play open-loop or feedback.
In the remainder of this section, the problem is solved for the open-loop equilibrium
and feedback equilibrium as well.
4.1 Open-Loop Solution
Here we characterize the open-loop equilibria of the three cases, starting with the autarchy
which is the simplest one because there is only one supplier in each country.
Proposition 2 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under autarky, the steady state levels
of the price and the individual output are
pOLAi = a  qOLAii ; qOLAii =
k(a  c)(k + r)
2(k(k + r) + s)
;
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where OLA denotes the open-loop equilibrium at autarchy. Such a steady state is saddle
point stable.
Proof. The Hamiltonian equation of rm i is:
HAi (t) = e
 t
n
qii(t) (a  qii (t)  c)  s
2
Z2(t) (13)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
;
where i(t) = i (t) e
t and i (t) is the co-state variable associated with Z(t). Consider
the rst-order condition w.r.t. qii(t):
@HAi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t)  c+ i(t) = 0: (14)
This yields the optimal open-loop output for the rm i as follows4:
qii (t) =

1
2
(a  c+ i(t)) if a > c  i(t);
0 otherwise.
(15)
The adjoint equation for the optimum is
@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
A
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ; (16)
and the associated transversality condition is
lim
t!1
i (t) :Z (t) = 0:
Di¤erentiating (15), using (16) and symmetry assumption, we obtain
dq (t)
dt
 _q (t) = 1
2
[(k + r)(t) + sZ (t)] : (17)
From (14), we know
(t) =  a+ 2q (t) + c:
By substituting this into (17), we have
_q (t) =  1
2
[(k + r) (a  2q (t)  c)  sZ (t)] : (18)
Therefore, the dynamic system can be rewritten in matrix form as follows:
_q
_Z

=

k + r s
2
2  k
 
q
Z

+
 1
2
(k + r) (a  c)
0

: (19)
4In the remainder, we consider the positive solution.
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Since the determinant of the above two-by-two matrix is negative, the equilibrium point
is a saddle, with
pOLAi = a  qOLAii ; qOLAii =
k(a  c)(k + r)
2(k(k + r) + s)
:
Proposition 3 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under unilateral trade, the steady state
levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pOLTi = a  qOLTii ; pOLNTj = a  qOLNTjj  mqOLTij ;
qOLTii =
3km2(a  c)(k + r) + a(m  2)(m  1)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m(7m  4))s ; (20)
qOLTij =
2k(c(m  2) + am)(k + r) + 4a(m  1)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m(7m  4))s ;
qOLNTjj =
2km(am+ c  2cm)(k + r)  a(m2 +m  2)s
6km2(k + r) + (4 +m( 4 + 7m))s ;
where OLT and OLNT denote the open-loop equilibrium in unilateral trade for trading
and not trading rms, respectively. Such a steady state is saddle point stable.
Proof. In unilateral trade, only one rm exports. The Hamiltonian for the trading and
not trading rms are
HTi (t) = e
 t
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(21)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
;
HNTj (t) = e
 t
nh
pj(t)qjj   cqj   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(22)
+ j(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]
o
:
The rst-order necessary conditions w.r.t. control variables, adjoint equations and associ-
ated transversality conditions for the optimum are
@HTi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t)  c+ i(t) = 0; (23)
@HTi (t)
@qij(t)
= am  2m2qij (t) mqjj (t)  c+ i(t) = 0; (24)
@HNTi (t)
@qjj(t)
= a  2qjj (t) mqij (t)  c+ j(t) = 0; (25)
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@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
T
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ; (26)
@j(t)
@t
= rj(t) 
@HNTj (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)j(t) + sZ (t) ; (27)
lim
t!1
i (t) :Z (t) = 0; lim
t!1
j (t) :Z (t) = 0:
Di¤erentiating FOCs w.r.t. time and using adjoint equations we obtain the following
control dynamical system:8<:
_qii (t) =  12 [(k + r) (a  2qii (t)  c)  sZ (t)] ;
_qij (t) =   13m2 [(k + r) (m (a  3mqij (t) + c)  2c)  s (2 m)Z (t)] ;
_qjj (t) =   13m [(k + r) (am  3mqjj (t)  c(2m  1))  s(2m  1)Z (t)] :
(28)
Solving (28) together with (1), yields the stable steady state equilibrium point in (20).
Proposition 4 At the open-loop Nash equilibrium under bilateral trade, the steady state
levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pOLBTi = a  qOLBTii  mqOLBTji ;
qOLBTii =
km(am+ c  2cm)(k + r) + 2a(1 m)s
3km2(k + r) + 4(m(m  1) + 1)s ; (29)
qOLBTij =
k(c(m  2) + am)(k + r) + 2a(m  1)s
3km2(k + r) + 4(m(m  1) + 1)s :
where OLBT denotes the open-loop equilibrium at bilateral trade. Such a steady state is
saddle point stable.
Proof. As mentioned before, the two rms and two countries are symmetric. Then, the
Hamiltonian function of each rm in bilateral trade is
HBTi (t) = e
 t
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(30)
+ i(t) [qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  qji(t)  kZ(t)]
o
:
Considering the rst-order conditions, adjoint equations and associated transversality con-
ditions:
@HBTi (t)
@qii(t)
= a  2qii (t) mqji (t)  c+ i(t) = 0;
@HBTi (t)
@qij(t)
= m (a  2mqij (t)  qjj (t))  c+ i(t) = 0;
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@i(t)
@t
= ri(t)  @H
BT
i (t)
@Z(t)
= (k + r)i(t) + sZ (t) ;
lim
t!1
i (t) :Z (t) = 0;
yields the dynamics of rm is controls:
_qii (t) =   13m [(k + r) (am  3mqii (t)  c(2m  1))  s(2m  1)Z (t)] ;
_qij (t) =   13m2 [(k + r) (m (a  3mqij (t) + c)  2c)  s (2 m)Z (t)] :
(31)
Solving (31) accompanied by the dynamics of rm js control variables and (1), fully
characterizes the stable steady state equilibrium point in (29).
4.2 Feedback Solution
Here, we characterize a subgame perfect Cournot equilibrium in Markov strategies where
rms employ pollution dependent decision rules when maximizing their discounted prot.
Therefore, changes in the stock of pollution stimulate responses, through Pigouvian tax,
by all players that are reected in their quantity choices.
Proposition 5 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under autarky, the steady state levels of
the price and the individual output are
pFAi = a  qFAii ; qFAii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eAZ + fA ;
where FA denotes the feedback equilibrium at autarchy and
eA =
1
3

2k + r  
p
(2k + r)2 + 6s

;
fA =
2(a  c)eA
2(k + r)  3eA :
Proof. The Bellman equation of rm i in autarchy is
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qii(t)
n
qii(t) [pi(t)  c]  s
2
Z2(t) (32)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
where Vi (Z (t)) is the value function of rm i. Given the linear quadratic form of the
maximand, we assume the quadratic value function:
Vi (Z) =
ei
2
Z2 + fiZ + gi; (33)
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so that
@Vi (Z)
@Z
= eiZ + fi: (34)
where ei, fi and gi are unknown coe¢ cients and the indication of time is omitted to ease
the exposition. Taking the FOC w.r.t. qii and using (34), we obtain:
qFAii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eAZ + fA ; pFAi = a  qFAii ; (35)
where eA and fA can be calculated by using (35) and rewriting (32) as follows:
1Z
2 + 2Z + 3 = 0; (36)
where
1 =
1
4

e(3eA   4k   2r)  2s ; (37)
2 =
1
4

4eA(a  c) + 2fA(3eA   2 (k + r)) ; (38)
3 =
1
4

(a  c)2 + fA(4 (a  c) + 3fA)  4gAr : (39)
Equation (36) is satised if expressions (37)-(39) are simultaneously zero. This results to
the following solution:
eA =
1
3

2k + r  
p
(2k + r)2 + 6s

;
fA =
2(a  c)eA
2(k + r)  3eA :
Proposition 6 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under unilateral trade, the steady state
levels of the prices and the individual outputs are
pFTi = a  qFTii ; pFNTj = a  qFNTjj  mqFTij ;
qFTii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  ;
qFTij =
(2 m)(eTZFT + fT   c) + am
3m2
;
qFNTjj =
c+m(a  2c) + (2m  1)(eTZFT + fT )
3m
;
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where FT and FNT denote the feedback equilibrium in unilateral trade for trading and
not trading rm and
eT =
9m2(2k + r)  3p9m4(2k + r)2 + 2m2(16 +m(37m  28))s
16 +m(37m  28) ;
fT =
eT (c(16 +m(25m  22))  am(11m+ 8))
eT (16 +m(37m  28))  18m2(k + r) :
Proof. The Bellman equations of trading and not trading rms in unilateral trade are5:
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qi(t)
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(40)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
rVj (Z (t)) = max
qj(t)
nh
pj(t)qjj   cqj   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(41)
+
@Vj (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  kZ(t)]

;
with the same value function form that was introduced before. Taking the FOCs w.r.t.
controls and using (34), we obtain:
qFTii =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  ; (42)
qFTij =
1
2m2
 
am  c+ eTZFT + fT  mqFNTjj

; (43)
qFNTjj =
1
2
 
a  c+ eTZFT + fT  mqFTij

: (44)
By solving (43) and (44) simultaneously, the amounts of qFTij and q
FNT
jj is taken. Using
these and rewriting (40) or (41) as (36) and as the same procedure as the previous proof,
we can calculate eT and fT .
Proposition 7 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under bilateral trade, the steady state
levels of the price and the individual outputs are
pFBTi = a  qFBTii  mqFBTji ;
qFBTii =
c+m(a  2c) + (fBT + eBT z)(2m  1)
3m
;
5We omit the full calculations but they are available upon request.
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qFBTij =
(2 m)(eBTZFBT + fBT   c) + am
3m2
;
ZFBT =
2(am(m+ 1) + 2(fBT   c)(m(m  1) + 1))
3km2   4eBT (m(m  1) + 1) ;
where FBT denotes the feedback equilibrium in bilateral trade and
eBT =
9m2(2k + r) p81m4(2k + r)2 + 36m2(22  28m+ 22m2)s
2(22  28m+ 22m2) ;
fBT =
eBT (m2(5a  16c) +m(5a+ 22c)  16c)
9m2(k + r)  eBT (22  28m+ 22m2) :
Proof. When there is trade between two countries, the Bellman equation of rm i is
rVi (Z (t)) = max
qi(t)
nh
pi(t)qii(t) + pj(t)mqij   cqi   s
2
Z2(t)
i
(45)
+
@Vi (Z (t))
@Z (t)
[qii(t) + qij(t) + qjj(t)  qji(t)  kZ(t)]

:
Taking the rst order necessary conditions and using the similar procedure with the pre-
vious proofs leads to nd the Nash equilibrium of the game in bilateral trade6.
Remark 8 The parameter m must be belong to (m
¯
; 1] in which m
¯
is
-
2c
a+ c
in the static game,
-
2ck(k + r) + 2as
k(a+ c)(k + r) + 2as
in the open-loop equilibrium,
- the positive root of k (f   c) (2 m) + a (km+ 2e (1 m)) = 0 in the feedback equilibrium where
(e; f) is equal to
 
eT ; fT

and
 
eBT ; fBT

for unilateral and bilateral trade,respectively,
otherwise rms do not have an incentive to trade due to high transportation cost. This
results from the condition qij > 0.
Corollary 3 In the dynamic equilibria, the maximum acceptable transportation cost de-
creases when s increases and in the limit when s goes to innity, it must be zero.
Proof. Di¤erentiating m
¯
, illustrated in remark 8, in the open-loop and the feedback equi-
libria w.r.t. s we found that @m¯
@s
> 0. Thus, increasing s leads to increasing the minimum
acceptable value of m or in the other word lowering the maximum rate of tranpostation
cost by which trade is doable.
6The full calculations are available upon request.
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Figure 2: (a) Prot comparison according to the level of transportation cost and tax rate
under the feedback information; (b) welfare comparison according to the level of negative
externality and tax rate under the open-loop information
5 Prot and Welfare Assessment
In this section, by using equilibrium values, we compare rmsprots in autarchy, unilateral
and bilateral trade to determine the equilibrium of the game between rms where they
decide to trade or not, in the open-loop and in the feedback solutions. In addition, we will
look into the case which leads to the e¢ cient level of social welfare.
Because of having too many parameters, comparing the results is di¢ cult. Therefore,
we use a numerical analysis to assess the prots and welfares in the three cases for the
open-loop and the feedback equilibria, respectively. In our setting, the parameters a; c; k
and r are given and in the remainder we assume that they have denite and plausible
values of 10; 0; 0:5 and 0:05, respectively.
In gure 2a, the prots of rms in di¤erent cases, under open-loop equilibria, is com-
pared according to the amounts of transportation cost and Pigouvian tax. As it can be seen
in this gure, the equilibrium of the game illustrated in gure 1 depends on the amounts
of m and s. In the region below the curve, trade is dominant strategy for both rms which
leads to the equilibrium
 
OLBT1 ; 
OLBT
2

and due to the fact that in this region the prot
of rms in autarchy is greater than bilateral trade, this game is a prisoners dilemma. In
the region above the curve, the condition of remark 8 is not satised. Therefore, non of
them choose trade strategy and
 
OLA1 ; 
OLA
2

is the equilibrium of the game.
Figure 2b depicts the regions that conditioned on the value of parameters h, s and
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Figure 3: (a) Prot comparison according to the level of transportation cost and tax rate
under the feedback information; (b) welfare comparison according to the level of negative
externality and tax rate under the feedback information
m bilateral trade (autarchy) becomes the preferable case from the social welfare point of
view. In this gure, for m = 1, the solid line divides the region of parameters h and s into
two areas where in the upper region bilateral trade is socially preferable and in the lower
area autarchy. The dashed line does the same but for m =m
¯
. For any other amount of m
we have an analogous boderline between the solid and the dash lines. As it can be seen
in the gure, when m decreases the area where bilateral trade is socially e¢ cient shrinks.
However, depending on the amount of existing h, policy maker can determine tax rate in
such a way that either bilateral trade or autarchy become socially e¢ cient.
Figure 3a compares the prots of rms in di¤erent cases according to the amounts of
transportation cost and Pigouvian tax for feedback information. As it can be seen in this
gure, in region I, wherem is close to one and s is not too large, trade is dominant strategy
for both rms which leads to the equilibrium
 
FBT1 ; 
FBT
2

. In this region the prot of
rms in autarchy is greater than bilateral trade, therefore, this equilibrium is not pareto
e¢ cient. In region II, there is not any unique equilibrium and rms play a chicken game.
If rms play simultaneously, they make a systematic mistake to reach the equilibrium, and
if they play sequentially, the problem is who plays rst and gains the enormous benets of
the trade. In the last region, III, because of high transportation cost, trade is not possible
and autarchy is the equilibrium.
In gure 3b, it is shown that which one of the three cases (autarchy, unilateral and
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bilateral trade) is socially e¢ cient according to the amounts of negative externality and
corrective tax rate. Similar to gure 2b the solid line is for m = 1 and the dashed line
is for m =m
¯
. In the region above the curves, bilateral trade is e¢ cient from the social
planner point of view. In the other region autarchy is socially e¢ cient. Note that in some
situations unilateral trade can be the e¢ cient case socially. It means that if what one
country gains is more than what the other looses, over all, they gain. But this makes a
huge coordination problem. The problem is that which country accepts not to sell to the
other country. In this case, there should be a side payment. Hence, unilateral trade is
very hard to sustain.
However, if the social planner makes a deal about taxation, he makes a deal about s
as well and this deal is di¤erent if he knows rms are playing open-loop equilibrium or
feedback equilibrium.
Consequently, if rms play under the open-loop strategies, in order for the socially
e¢ cient equilibrium coincides with the market equilibrium, according to the amounts of h
and m,social planner must determine s in a way that it characterizes a point in the lower
(upper) region of gure 2a and the uper (lower) region in gure 2b. The most e¢ cient
point for the welfare (if it is applicable) takes place on the dividing curves (depended on
m) in gure 2b.
If rms play under the feedback rule, bilateral trade can be the most preferable case
if social planner can determine the tax rate, according to the amounts of h and m, in a
way that it characterizes a point in region I of gure 3a and the upper region in gure 3b.
Otherwise, he must choose s such that the equilibrium characterizes a point in region III
of gure 3a and the lower region in gure 3b where autarchy is the preferable case.
However, it is not clear to social planners whether rms are playing open-loop or
feedback. Considering the gure 2, if social planners assume that rms are playing under
open-loop equilibrium and they determine s in order to induce bilateral trade, they may
face an unexpected outcome. Because if rms are playing feedback instead of open-loop,
autarchy may be welfare improving provided that the point places in the region above
the curve in gure 2b and below the curve in gure 3b. Therefore, to avoid this problem
policy makers must determine s for any given exogenous pair of (h; s) to satisfy the stricter
constraint.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have theoretically addressed e¤ects of trade liberalization in a two country
world di¤erential polluting oligopoly game. We found out when rms decide to trade or
not, if the transportation cost is not too large, under the open-loop information they
play a prisoners dilemma in which trade is the dominant strategy for both otherwise
they play autarchy. In order for trade to be dominant strategy in feedback information,
the Pigouvian tax and transportation cost must have relatively lower values. For larger
amounts of transportation cost and corrective tax, the equilibrium can be unilateral trade
or autarchy.
By comparing social welfares in autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade, we showed
that, depending on the e¤ects of negative externality on consumer and the transportation
cost, policy maker can determine the amount of Pigouvian tax so that market equilibrium
coincides with socially e¢ cient equilibrium. This taxation is di¤erent if rms are playing
open-loop equilibrium as compare to the feedback equilibrium.
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